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Abstract
We consider the problem of maximizing revenue when selling k items to a single
buyer with known valuation distributions. Hart and Nisan [2] raised some questions
on the approximation of maximizing revenue from selling a set of items by selling
each item separately or all in a bundle. In this work we show that for a single, additive
buyer whose valuations for for the items are distributed according to i.i.d. distributions
which are known to the seller, the ratio of revenue from selling in a bundle to selling
separately is at least 55.9% and this gap is attainable.
1 Introduction
We are looking at the problem of maximizing revenue in the scenario of a single seller
selling multiple items to a single buyer. This paper is limited to the case where the bidder’s
valuations of the items are identically and independently distributed and the bidder valuation
is additive. The distributions (given by a cumulative distribution F ) are known to the seller
but their realizations are not.
For one item, the problem was completely solved by Myerson’s classic result [3]. If the
seller offers to sell it for a price p, then the probability that the buyer will buy is 1− F (p),
and the revenue will be p · (1 − F (p)). The seller will choose a price p∗ that maximizes
this expression. Myerson’s characterization of optimal auctions concludes that the take-
it-or-leave-it offer at the above price p∗ yields the optimal revenue among all mechanisms.
Myerson’s result also applies when there are multiple buyers, in which case p∗ would be the
reserve price in a second price auction.
For more then one item, the problem of maximizing the revenue is more complicated.
One approach is selling each item separately with take-it-or-leave-it offer of its Myerson’s
price. We denote the revenue from this approach by SRev. A second approach is considering
all the items as one bundle and selling the bundle for its Myerson’s price. We denote the
revenue from this approach by BRev.
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Previous work by Hart and Nisan [2] have shown that while the ratio SRev/BRev may be
arbitrarily small for some one-dimensional distributions, the opposite is not true. That is, the
infimum of the ratio of BRev/SRev over all the one-dimensional distributions is bounded.
Despite the fact that when the number of items goes to infinity this ratio goes to 1 (see, for
example, Appendix E in [2]), it was not clear what the exact ratio is for a finite number of
items. Hart and Nisan have shown this ratio is bounded between 1
4
and 57%. We show a
tight result on this proportion of approximately 55.9%.
Theorem 1. Let rˆ ≈ 55.9%1. For every integer k ≥ 1 and every one-dimensional distribu-
tion F
BRev(F k) ≥ rˆkRev(F ) = rˆSRev(F k)
and the worst-case bound is tight in the sense that for every  > 0, there exist an integer k
and a one-dimensional distribution F such that
BRev(F k) < (rˆ + )SRev(F k)
2 Notation and Preliminaries
For a cumulative distribution F on Rk+ (for k ≥ 1), we consider the optimal revenue, Rev(F ),
obtainable from selling k items to a (single, additive) buyer whose valuation for the k items
is jointly distributed according to F , and define:
• SRev(F ) is the maximal revenue obtainable by selling each item separately.
• BRev(F ) is the maximal revenue obtainable by bundling all items and selling them
together.
Let B(m; k, c/k) =
∑m
i=0
(
k
m
)
( c
k
)i(1 − c
k
)k−i be the cumulative function of the binomial
distribution2 and P (m; c) = e−c
∑m
i=0 c
i/i! be the cumulative function of the Poisson distri-
bution, which is a known approximation to B(m; k, c/k) as k goes to infinity.
In this work, we will use an approximation for the probability for a buyer to have a
valuations sum of at least d where each item valuation is distributed over {0, 1} with P(1) =
x/k. This event is equivalent to the complementary event described by B(d− 1; k, x/k) and
its probability is 1−B(d− 1; k, x/k).
Notation 1. hd(x) = 1 − P (d − 1;x) = 1 − e−x
∑d−1
i=0
xi
i!
is an approximation of the above
probability.
In addition, we will need the following constants:
1. cˆ = 2.655... is the solution x of 2h2(x) = 3h3(x)
2. rˆ = 2h2(cˆ)/cˆ ≈ 0.599...
1rˆ will be define formally in the next section
2I.e., the probability of at most m, out of k, to be successful where each event is successful with indepen-
dent probability c/k
2
3 Upper Bound
In this section we prove the upper bound of Theorem 1 on the worst-case BRev/SRev ratio.
Theorem. For any  > 0, there exist an integer k and a one-dimensional distribution F
such that
BRev(F k) < (rˆ + )SRev(F k)
Proof. Consider the distribution F over {0, 1} with P(1) = cˆ/k, so the revenue from optimally
selling a single item is cˆ/k. For estimating the bundle revenue from posted price d, we can
use the approximation hd(cˆ) for having a valuations sum of at least d and getting an expected
revenue of dhd(cˆ). Doing so, we can see that the revenue from posting bundle price of 2 or
3 will gain approximately 2h2(cˆ) = 3h3(cˆ) ≈ 1.48... .
For large enough k, the probability of the valuations sum to be at least d is bounded by
·cˆd/d!. Hence, the revenue is bounded by d · cˆd/d!, which for d > 7 is < 1.3. For 4 ≤ d ≤ 7,
we have dhd(cˆ) < 1.48. Thus, BRev(F
k)/SRev(F k) = 2hd(cˆ)/cˆ +  = rˆ +  for k large
enough.
4 Lower Bound
In this section we will show the lower bound of Theorem 1. In order to show this, we first
prove the theorem in the case where the values are drawn from a Bernoulli distribution.
We start by showing in Lemma 1 that in this case, the distribution F over {0, 1} with
P(1) = c/k with c ≥ 40, will gain a high enough profit with high enough probability by
selling in a bundle. Then we handle the case of c < 40 by proving it separately for k = 2, 3,
and k ≥ 4 in Lemmas 2,3 and 5. To prove lemma 5, we use lemma 4 due to Anderson
and Samuels, which bounds the difference between the binomial and Poisson distributions,
and we use it to bound the approximation of the probability of getting a price d, hd for
a small number of items. We conclude by proving the lower bound of Theorem 1 for any
one-dimensional distribution.
Lemma 1. For any integer k ≥ 1 and c ≥ 40, the distribution F over {0, 1} with P(1) = c/k
satisfies
BRev(F k)/SRev(F k) > 0.56
Proof. Using the Chernoff bound we can bound the probability of selling in a bundle for
price of at least 0.65c for c ≥ 40 by 1−
(
e−0.35
(0.65)0.65
)40
> 0.9. For c ≥ 40, let d be an integer s.t.
0.625c ≤ d ≤ 0.65c. Such d always exists. Since d ≥ 0.625c and the probability of getting at
least d is more than 90%, BRev(F k)/SRev(F k) ≥ 0.5625.
To prove the case of c < 40 we preform a separate analysis of the cases k = 2, 3, and
k ≥ 4.
Lemma 2. For k = 2, and any c, the distribution F over {0, 1} with P(1) = c/2 satisfies
BRev(F 2)/SRev(F 2) ≥ 2/3
3
Proof. We consider two cases. For c ≤ 4/3, if we sell at price 1 then the revenue ratio is
2(c/2)−(c/2)2
c
, which in this range gives a ratio of at least 2/3. For c > 4/3, if we sell at price
2 then the revenue ratio is 2((c/2)
2)
c
, which in this range also gives a ratio of at least 2/3.
Lemma 3. For k = 3, and any c, the distribution F over {0, 1} with P(1) = c/3 satisfies
BRev(F 3)/SRev(F 3) > 0.6
Proof. We consider three cases. For c ≤ 1.325, if we sell at price 1 then the revenue ratio is
1−(1−c/3)3
c
, which in this range gives a ratio of at least 0.623. For 1.325 < c ≤ 2.571, if we sell
at price 2 then the revenue ratio is 2(1−(1−c/3)
3−3(c/3)(1−c/3)2)
c
, which in this range also gives a
ratio of at least 0.623. For c > 2.5714 if we sell at price 3 then the revenue ratio is 3(c/3)
3
c
,
which in this range gives a ratio of at least 0.734.
In order to conclude the lower bound for the case of c < 40 and an arbitrary k, we
use the following result by Anderson and Samuels [1] regarding the Poisson approximation,
P (m; c) = e−c, to the binomial distribution, B(m; k, c/k).
Lemma 4. (Anderson and Samuels [1]) The difference P (m; c) − B(m; k, c/k) is positive
when m ≤ c(1− 1/(k + 1)).
From lemma 4, we conclude:
Corollary 1. If d ≤ c(1− 1/(k + 1)) + 1, then hd(c) is a lower bound for the probability of
preforming a sell when when offering a bundle price of d.
Using this approximation we can handle the case of small c by simply finding the optimal
price for each c.
Lemma 5. For integer k ≥ 4 and c < 40, the distribution F over {0, 1} with P(1) = c/k
satisfies
BRev(F k)/SRev(F k) ≥ rˆ
Proof. Given the parameter c we can determent a bundle price which will give a revenue
which reaches a bundle to separate ratio of at least the desired bound.
The segments in left column of Table 1 are matched with a price which ensures a revenue
which reaches at least the ratio in the right column for any c < 40. The end points of each
segment are where dhd(x) = (d + 1)hd+1(x). It is easy to see that the largest gap is indeed
at cˆ, the solution of 2h2(x) = 3h3(x).
The derivative of hd(x)/x satisfies(hd(x)/x)
′ = e−xp(x)/x2+e−xp(x)/x−1/x2−e−xp′(x)/x
where p(x) =
∑d−1
i=0 x
i/i!. For each d, the range dominated by d has at most one extreme
point in it which can easily be verified as a maximum point. Thus, it is indeed enough to
check only the end points of each range.3
As stated by Corollary 1, if d ≤ c(1− 1/(k + 1)) + 1 then hd(c) is a lower bound for the
probability of getting price d. For k ≥ 4, the condition holds for all of the above.
3Both ends are needed due to some of the ds getting maximum points in the range dominated by d. See
Figure 1.
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Figure 1: d · hd(c)/c for d ≤ 8 as a function of c
We can now prove the lower bound of Theorem 1 for a general distribution.
Theorem. For every integer k ≥ 1 and every one-dimensional distribution F ,
BRev(F k) ≥ rˆkRev(F ) = rˆSRev(F k)
Proof. Let X be distributed according to F ; let p be the optimal Myerson price for X and
q = P(X ≥ p), so Rev(F ) = pq. Let G be the distribution over {0, p} with P(p) = q.
We claim that BRev(F k)/SRev(F k) ≥ BRev(Gk)/SRev(Gk).
First, SRev(Gk) = pqk = SRev(F k). Second, for any price pd where d ∈ N, the proba-
bility of selling a bundle according to F is at least as much as according to G, since in the
latter case we must have at least d events out of k with probability q for each, and for G
it is sufficient for getting at least d. For any other price gp, the chances of selling a bundle
according to G is the same as selling in bgcp, and for F the probability is at least that.
Let c = qk and H be the distribution over {0, 1} with P(1) = q = c/k. Since BRev(Gk) =
pBRev(Hk), SRev(Gk) = pSRev(Hk) and for H we have already shown this threshold,
therefore the bound holds.
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c segments Price for segment Gap in the end points
c ≤ 1.256... d = 1 1, 0.569
1.256... ≤ c ≤ 2.655... d = 2 0.569, 0.559
2.655... ≤ c ≤ 4.057... d = 3 0.559, 0.569
4.057... ≤ c ≤ 5.441... d = 4 0.569, 0.581
5.441... ≤ c ≤ 6.805... d = 5 0.581, 0.594
6.805... ≤ c ≤ 8.152... d = 6 0.594, 0.605
8.152... ≤ c ≤ 9.482... d = 7 0.605, 0.615
9.482... ≤ c ≤ 10.79... d = 8 0.615, 0.624
10.79... ≤ c ≤ 12.10... d = 9 0.624, 0.633
12.10... ≤ c ≤ 13.39... d = 10 0.633, 0.641
13.39... ≤ c ≤ 14.68... d = 11 0.641, 0.648
14.68... ≤ c ≤ 15.95... d = 12 0.648, 0.654
15.95... ≤ c ≤ 17.21... d = 13 0.654, 0.661
17.21... ≤ c ≤ 18.47... d = 14 0.661, 0.666
18.47... ≤ c ≤ 19.72... d = 15 0.666, 0.672
19.72... ≤ c ≤ 20.96... d = 16 0.672, 0.677
20.96... ≤ c ≤ 22.20... d = 17 0.677, 0.682
22.20... ≤ c ≤ 23.44... d = 18 0.682, 0.686
23.44... ≤ c ≤ 24.67... d = 19 0.686, 0.690
24.67... ≤ c ≤ 25.89... d = 20 0.690, 0.694
25.89... ≤ c ≤ 27.11... d = 21 0.695, 0.698
27.11... ≤ c ≤ 28.33... d = 22 0.698, 0.702
28.33... ≤ c ≤ 40 d = 23 0.702, 0.574
Table 1: Pricing for c < 40
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